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Abstract
We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-
operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions,
as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field
public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results
show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account
of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those
with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated
in high corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic
beliefs about others’ contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important
mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of cor-
ruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for
public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.
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1 Introduction
With the increased dispersion of income and wealth in many countries, the effects of economic
inequality are a growing concern.1 Many cross-country studies find that the consequences
of excessive inequality span from slower economic growth and development to the rise of
political discontent (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). However,
research increasingly shows that individual-level reactions to inequality depend on what one
perceives as the sources of inequality. People are more tolerant of inequality if it results
from effort or merit and deem inequality to be unfair if it is due to luck or connections (e.g.,
Durante et al., 2014; Lefgren et al., 2016; Alm̊as et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2013; Fehr et
al., 2020).
We examine the effects of inequality on a crucial aspect of social capital, namely, cooperation.
As it has been postulated that institutions that people interact with on a daily basis and
have been exposed to during their life can affect their perceptions of inequality (Bowles, 1998;
Almås et al., 2020), we further investigate whether responses to inequality depend on the
local institutional quality. To do this, we conduct a large-scale representative lab-in-the-field
experiment across 22 provinces in rural Vietnam, including a sample of over 1,300 members
of the local population. We run public goods games in areas characterized by varying lev-
els of institutional quality, and exogenously vary the distribution of initial endowments to
understand the heterogeneous impacts of inequality on willingness to cooperate.
Income and wealth inequalities potentially reduce identification and solidarity across social
groups, and undermine the institutional framework underpinning cooperation (e.g., Bardhan
et al., 2007; Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002).2 When it comes to cooperation, many
people have reciprocity preferences such that they are willing to contribute to the public
1See Milanovic (2016), Piketty (2014) and Ravallion (2018).
2There is also a body of work showing that ethnic or racial heterogeneity - by increasing social distance
- leads to depletion of social capital (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 1999).
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good as long as others reciprocate fairly (Fischbacher et al., 2001).3 From this perspective,
inequality makes cooperation harder as it is more difficult to determine what constitutes a
‘fair’ contribution in an unequal group. In unequal groups, people may view either equal
absolute contributions or equal contribution shares or contributions that equalize ex-post
income or utility as ‘fair’ (Reuben and Riedl, 2013). This ambiguity renders coordination on
socially optimal equilibria more difficult. Our first hypothesis is that inequality negatively
affects cooperation.
The reciprocity model highlights the importance of expectations about other group members’
contributions. Cooperation decisions are often not based on observed actions, but on expec-
tations of the actions of others. To the extent that institutions affect preferences, the quality
of local institutions and people’s experiences and engagement with those institutions, may
affect expectations and behavior in the experimental games we implement.4 In our analysis,
we measure the quality of local institutions by the presence of corruption.
Corruption imposes a direct cost by diverting resources and resulting in lower public goods
provision (e.g., Beekman et al., 2014; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Further, corruption
may also create indirect costs in the form of damage to social capital. In rural areas of
developing countries, corruption is pervasive and mainly benefits relatively well-off members
of society including public officials (Olken and Pande, 2012). Such widespread corruption
may induce beliefs that wealth accumulation is largely due to rent-seeking and thus the
perceived sources of inequality are unjustifiable or unfair (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005),
leading individuals to have inferior expectations about the other participants’ willingness
to cooperate. Individuals may also exercise ‘moral wiggle room’ (Dana et al., 2007) and
3Other reasons for contributions noted in the literature are altruism, warm glow and inequality aversion
(e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2011).
4In lab settings, studies find that expectations about behavior may be affected by people’s experiences
outside the experiment (e.g., Barr and Serra, 2010; Bigoni et al., 2019; Cameron et al., 2009; Gangadharan
et al., 2016).
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contribute less in more corrupt areas, especially as the norms for fair contributions are
ambiguous in more unequal societies. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that inequality
has a stronger, negative effect on cooperation in high corruption than in low corruption
environments.
Several insights emerge from our study. We find that aggregate contributions to the public
good are significantly lower in groups characterized by inequality. However, in terms of
share contributed, there is no difference between equal and unequal groups. Within unequal
groups, low endowment individuals contribute a higher share to the public good than high
endowment individuals. Further, both low and high endowment types contribute smaller
shares in communes characterized by higher corruption, our proxy for local institutional
quality. We also find that individuals’ own contributions are positively correlated with their
beliefs about average contributions of others in their group. In areas with high corruption,
both high and low endowment individuals have more pessimistic expectations about their
fellow group members’ contributions than those in low-corruption areas do. This is an
important mechanism that explains why corruption exacerbates the effects of inequality on
cooperation. These findings speak to a nascent literature showing that suspicions about
causes of inequality affect attitudes towards redistribution (Bortolotti et al., 2017; Cappelen
et al., 2018; Fehr, 2018; Klimm, 2019). Overall, our results imply that rising inequality may
harm collective action in rural areas of developing countries, and that this effect may be
intensified by poorly functioning local institutions, to the extent that such institutions are
characterized by corruption and other forms of anti-social behavior.
Vietnam is a particularly informative context for conducting this study. First, collective
action issues are widely recognized as being important in rural Vietnam. A large share of
agriculture is irrigation-based and therefore requires collective action to build and maintain
irrigation infrastructure (World Bank, 2016). Our experiment is implemented in areas where
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irrigation is prevalent. Also, due to population pressure, common property resources such
as forestry, fishery and water resources are scarce.5 Second, while inequality has increased
less in Vietnam than in China and other post-socialist countries, there have been marked
increases in inequality in rural areas in recent years (Benjamin et al., 2017). Third, corruption
is a highly significant issue in Vietnam (Bai et al., 2019). To illustrate, in 2017, Vietnam
was ranked 107 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s index of perceived
corruption in the public sector and had a score well below the average. Petty corruption
remains rampant.
This study contributes to and brings together two research strands. The first is the literature
on the effects of economic inequality on voluntary cooperation. The experimental evidence on
the effects of endowment inequality on cooperation is not conclusive. While Anderson et al.
(2008), Buckley and Croson (2006), Cherry et al. (2005) and Hargreaves-Heap et al. (2016)
find that inequality reduces public good contributions, others find evidence that inequality
increases contributions (e.g., Chan et al., 1996; Visser and Burns, 2015). However, meta-
analyses show that, on average, heterogeneous endowments negatively affect contributions
(Zelmer, 2003).6
Second, our work broadly relates to the literature on the effect of institutions on individual
preferences and beliefs. Preferences related to cooperation, trust, and redistribution have
been shown to be influenced by historical institutions (Bigoni et al., 2018; Putnam, 2000),
exposure to conflict (Bauer et al., 2016), identity of leaders (Gangadharan et al., 2016),
property rights (Di Tella et al., 2007), and market conditions (Khadjavi et al., forthcoming).
5The Vietnamese government plays an important part in providing irrigation infrastructure (Markussen
et al., 2011), regulating resource use and many other local-level issues (e.g., World Bank, 2016). However,
self-organized collective action remains important wherein small-scale infrastructure is deemed villagers’
responsibility (Carlsson et al., 2015). Also, perhaps the most important and difficult collective action problem
in a non-democratic single-party setting, such as Vietnam, is to keep the local government accountable.
6There are also papers that study situations with equal endowments but unequal returns. For instance,
Olson (1965) argued that wealth inequality may encourage public goods contributions, on the assumption
that the wealthy have larger returns from the public good than the poor.
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More specifically, corruption, a key indicator of institutional quality, dampens motivation to
contribute to public goods (Cagala et al., 2019). This can be because of betrayal aversion
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Cubitt et al., 2017), self-serving beliefs (Di Tella et al., 2015)
and reciprocity (Sugden, 1984). Exposure to corruption has also been shown to affect dis-
honest behavior, willingness to bribe, and propensity to punish corrupt behavior (Ajzenman,
2020; Barr and Serra, 2009; Cameron et al., 2009).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details of the study design and pro-
cedures. Section 3 describes the sample and the empirical specification. Section 4 presents
the results and Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Study design and procedures
2.1 Study design
The study was divided into two parts: the first part was a series of experimental tasks and
the second was a post-experiment survey.7 The experimental part consisted of three tasks
conducted sequentially, with no feedback being provided between tasks. The first task varied
across sessions while the second and third tasks were the same across all sessions.
The first task was a standard linear one-shot public goods game. In this task, all subjects
were randomly and anonymously divided into groups of four, such that they did not know
the identity of others in their group. Each group member received an initial endowment and
had to indicate the amount of money they wanted to allocate to the group account, with
the remainder automatically accruing to their private account. The total amount allocated
to the group account by all four members was doubled and then distributed equally among
7Experimental instructions are available with the authors upon request.
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them. The total earnings per subject, therefore, was the sum of earnings from the group
account and the money in the private account. The payoff function is as follows:




where πi, Ei, and ci are the total earnings, initial endowment, and public good contribution
of individual i, respectively. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) is 0.5. This implies a
social dilemma where for a self-interested and rational individual, the dominant strategy is
to free-ride and contribute nothing, while the social optimum for a group is achieved if all
members contribute the full endowment to the group account.
As our interest was in understanding the effect of inequality on contribution to public goods,
we had two treatments of the public goods game. In the first treatment (equal), all subjects
had an initial endowment of VND 60,000.8 In the second treatment (unequal), we induced
inequality such that half the subjects in each group had endowments of VND 30,000 (low)
while the other half had VND 90,000 (high). Note that in both treatments, the total initial
group endowments were fixed at VND 240,000. We used a between-subjects design, i.e., each
subject only played in one treatment of the game.
Upon completion of the first part of the task, there was an incentivized belief elicitation
component wherein subjects were asked to estimate the average of the remaining group
members’ contributions (as in Thöni et al., 2012). Specifically, they were presented with
possible ranges of allocations to the group account, and were asked to indicate the range
they believed the other three group members had on average allocated to the group account.
Based on ex post calculations of contributions, if their beliefs were accurate, they received
VND 30,000 and 0 otherwise in the equal treatment. In the unequal treatment, subjects had
8The local currency is Vietnamese Dong (VND). At the time of the study, the exchange rate was 1 USD
= 22,500 VND.
6
to indicate how much they believed the other group members with low and high endowments
allocated on average to the group account separately. They received VND 30,000 for each
accurate guess, and 0 otherwise.
The second task was a trust game, using strategy method, where all subjects played the role
of sender and receiver. The final task was a game to measure honest behavior, inspired by
the design of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
Upon completion of the experimental tasks, one of the three tasks was randomly selected for
payment on the basis of a dice roll, and was announced to the subjects. However, they were
not informed of their individual earnings until after the completion of a short post-experiment
questionnaire.9 Enumerators conducted individual face-to-face interviews with all subjects
to complete the questionnaire. This collected information on background characteristics such
as age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status and asset ownership, and responses to
non-incentivized questions on willingness to take risk, trust and helpfulness etc.
As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, subjects were presented with statements to
elicit individual experiences and beliefs about corruption in the public sector with specific ref-
erence to bribery to obtain land titles, to get a government job, to receive medical treatment
etc. Subjects were asked how much they agreed with each of the six presented statements
on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2 meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3 meant
‘disagree’ and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. These statements were taken from a summary
indicator of the quality of governance titled ‘Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Ad-
ministration Performance Index’ (hereafter, PAPI).10 To create a commune-level corruption
measure, for each statement, subjects indicating agreement (i.e., agree completely or some-
9We announced the chosen task, upon completion of the experimental tasks but before the questionnaire
so that subjects were free to leave once their questionnaire was completed. While subjects could estimate
their earnings from the final task, this was not possible for the other two tasks as payoffs were dependent on
others’ decisions.
10PAPI is a survey that has been conducted annually since 2009 across Vietnam, to measure the perfor-
mance of central and local governments in governance, public administration and public service delivery.
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what agree) are coded as 1, and those expressing disagreement are coded as 0, such that the
sum of responses for each subject lies between 0 and 6. We then construct the commune-
level index as an average of the individual responses. ‘High corruption’ communes are those
with the commune-level index above the sample median while those lying below the sample
median are considered as ‘low corruption’ communes. Therefore, we have a binary variable
that takes a value 1 for high corruption communes, and 0 for low corruption communes.
In Section 4.1, we show that our results are robust to different ways of constructing the
corruption index.
After subjects completed the post-experiment questionnaire, they were informed about and
received their individual earnings in sealed envelopes. The average duration of a session
was between 2 and 2.5 hours. The average amount earned was approximately VND 142,000
(about 6.5 USD) which was inclusive of a participation fee of VND 50,000. This compares
favourably with the average daily wage of VND 166,700 in rural Vietnam in 2016.
Overall, we conducted 112 sessions across 56 communes such that in each commune, one
session of each treatment of the public goods game (equal and unequal endowments) was
organized. Finally, we also conducted a brief commune-level survey, administered face-to-
face to a senior knowledgeable official in the commune. This elicited information about the
commune population and basic demographics, availability of infrastructure and public goods,
and key sources of income and employment, etc.
2.2 Study procedures
The study was conducted in May-June 2017 in 56 rural communes across 22 provinces in the
Red River Delta (north) and Mekong River Delta (south) of Vietnam. We focused on the
north and south of Vietnam as recent work finds that different historical trajectories have
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led to cultural and economic differences (e.g., Ho et al., 2019). Figure 1 maps the study
provinces.
Two sessions with 12 subjects each were organized in each commune, leading to a sample of
1,344 subjects. Sessions were conducted in spaces provided by the commune headquarters,
and were organized in the morning and in the afternoon.11
We obtained listings of households in the communes, and the study team contacted the
households to advertise the study and to encourage participation. The study was advertised
as trying to understand social change in rural Vietnam, and individuals were informed that
they would earn a fixed participation fee of VND 50,000 along with a chance to earn more. If
more than 12 individuals showed up at a given time, then 12 of them were randomly picked
to participate. The remaining individuals were paid the show-up fee and asked to leave. We
excluded the participation of commune officials and individuals under the age of eighteen in
our study.
Experiments were conducted in Vietnamese, and using pen and paper. Experimenters read
out aloud the instructions for each task one at a time. To ensure comprehension, examples
were presented for each task using display charts. For the first two tasks, we also administered
practice quizzes to ensure that subjects understood the games and the payoff implications
of their decisions. A photograph of an experiment session is provided in Figure A1 in the
online Appendix.
11We randomized the sequence of equal and unequal endowment sessions across communes such that in
half the communes the equal endowment sessions were held in the morning, and in the afternoon in the
remaining communes.
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3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Sample description
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the pre-determined individual characteristics used
in our analysis. Column 1 contains the summary statistics for the full sample, and columns
2 and 3 present the summary statistics by allocation to equal and unequal treatments.
The sample of subjects was well-balanced in terms of gender with 52 percent of subjects being
female. The average age is around 38 years while 81 percent were married. Approximately
54 percent of the sample had completed high school education. On average, households to
which these subjects belonged owned 9 out of 16 assets listed in the questionnaire.12 Around
8 percent of them were classified as being poor according to the government authorities.
Ninety-two percent of the sample belonged to the Kinh majority ethnic group. As column
4 shows, we do not find much difference between the observed characteristics of individuals
assigned to the equal or unequal treatment sessions, indicating that the randomization of
individuals was successful.13 The only exception is the share of married individuals where
in the equal treatment, 83 percent are married as compared to 79 percent in the unequal
treatment (p− value = 0.06). Further, we are also unable to reject the null hypothesis that
the pre-determined individual characteristics are jointly different across the two treatments
(F-test p− value = 0.48).
We also find that the individuals who participated in our study are broadly representative of
the rural population of these provinces. Table A1 in the online Appendix shows the means
12The questionnaire elicited whether households owned each of the following assets: bicycle, black
and white TV, colour TV, scooter/motorcycle/moped, landline telephone, mobile phone, electric fan, ra-
dio/stereo, pump set, refrigerator, computer/laptop, internet access, washing machine, cooler/air condi-
tioner, car/truck/van, and flush toilet.
13Unless stated otherwise, we report two-sided p-values from a simple proportions test (for dichotomous
variables only) or t-test (all other variables).
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of the observed characteristics of the experiment subjects and those of the rural population
of the 22 provinces as computed from the Vietnam Household and Living Standards Survey
(VHLSS) 2016. We find that the two samples are quite similar though the experiment
subjects are more educated. Positive selection based on education into participation in
such artefactual field experiments has also been shown in other work (e.g., Frijters et al.,
2015).
Summary statistics of the corruption statements are provided in Table A2 in the online
Appendix. Approximately 33 and 37 percent of subjects respectively agree that bribes are
important for receiving medical treatment and to get a government job. Twenty-eight percent
agree that bribes are needed to get land titles while 26 percent agree that bribes have to
be paid to teachers to better attend to their children. Approximately 20 and 16 percent
respectively believe that public officials receive kickbacks for granting construction permits
and that officials divert state funds for private gains.
As a validation check for our corruption data, we use data from PAPI reports that are
available at the province level, and check its correlation with our own survey data also
aggregated to the province level. These six statements are a subset of the ‘control of corrup-
tion’ sub-index from PAPI. We find that the average responses from our survey are fairly
strongly and significantly correlated with the PAPI ‘control of corruption’ sub-index for
2017 (Spearman′s rank correlation = 0.5, p − value = 0.02). Further, since the corruption
statements were asked after the experiments, a concern may be that exposure to randomly
generated inequality in the public goods game may itself affect responses on corruption ques-
tions. We do not find any significant differences in reported corruption based on exposure to
the inequality treatment (p−value = 0.64). We also check this by regressing the individual-
level corruption index on the inequality treatment and controls. Results in Table A3 in




We first use OLS regressions to estimate the effect of inequality on cooperation using the
following equation:
Cisj = α0 + α1Unequalsj +
K∑
l=2
αlXisj + υj + εisj (2)
where the outcome variable, Cisj, is the contribution to the public good (measured either
as amount or share contributed) by participant i in session s in commune j; Unequalsj is
a dummy variable that indicates a session s with unequal endowments in commune j. The
coefficient α1 captures the effect of inequality in endowments on contributions to the group
account. Xisj includes individual-level controls discussed in Table 1, i.e., age, gender (takes
a value 1 for female), education (takes a value 1 for those who have completed high school),
marital status (takes a value 1 if married), ethnicity (takes a value 1 for the ethnic majority
Kinh), poverty status (takes a value 1 for those classified as poor by the government),
and household’s asset ownership. In addition, we include commune fixed effects (υj) to
account for common factors that affect all individuals within a commune. Standard errors
are clustered at the session level as there may be correlation in the error terms between
individuals in the same session.
To examine the differences in responses by low and high endowment participants, we modify
equation 2 as follows:
Cisj = β0 + β1LowEndwisj + β2HighEndwisj +
K∑
l=3
βlXisj + υj + εisj (3)
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where LowEndwisj and HighEndwisj are dummy variables for participants with low and
high endowments in a session with unequal endowments, respectively. The coefficients β1
and β2 capture how the contributions by low and high endowment participants differ from
those in sessions with equal endowments, respectively. We also test if β1 = β2 to check
whether contributions by low and high endowment participants differ significantly from each
other.
Finally, we interact the endowment terms with the indicator variable for high corruption to
understand the joint effect on cooperation in the following manner:
Cisj = γ0 + γ1LowEndwisj + γ2HighEndwisj + γ3LowEndwisj ∗HighCorruptionj (4)
+ γ4HighEndwisj ∗HighCorruptionj +
K∑
l=5
γlXisj + υj + εisj
Note that we cannot include the corruption indicator separately as it is collinear with com-
mune fixed effects (υj). Our coefficients of interest are γ3 and γ4. If γ3 < 0 (γ4 < 0), it
implies that low (high) endowment participants in high corruption communes contribute
less than low (high) endowment participants in low corruption communes. Further, γ1 + γ3
and γ2 + γ4 capture the marginal effect of low and high endowment respectively in a high
corruption commune, relative to having equal endowments. If (γ1 + γ3) - (γ2 + γ4) > 0,
contributions by low endowment participants are greater than those by high endowment
participants in the presence of high corruption.
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4 Results
4.1 The effect of inequality and corruption
In Table 2 we report the amount and share contributed to public goods under the equal
and unequal endowment treatments. The average amount contributed is 31,186 VND with
amounts being significantly larger in the equal version (p − value ≤ 0.001). Figure 2 also
shows that, at the group-level, the size of public good created is significantly smaller in groups
with heterogeneous endowments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p − value = 0.001). Within
unequal groups, as seen in Panel (a) of Figure 3, high endowment individuals contribute
significantly greater amounts than those with low endowments (p − value ≤ 0.001). The
share contributed is approximately 55 percent and this does not vary significantly between
equal and unequal treatments (Table 2, p − value = 0.33). However, the share contributed
by the low endowment subjects is significantly greater than the share contributed by high
endowment individuals (Panel (b) of Figure 3, p − value ≤ 0.001). As shown in Table 2,
the number of free-riders, i.e., those who contribute nothing, in our sample is low, only 30
out of 1,344 subjects contributed zero. The share of free-riders is slightly higher in the equal
treatment (p − value = 0.065) but the magnitude is negligible. On the other hand, 275
subjects, i.e., approximately 20 percent contributed the full amount. These numbers are in
line with findings from other one-shot public goods games where contributions in the 40-60
percent range are typically observed (e.g., see review in Chaudhuri, 2011) as well as previous
evidence from Vietnam (e.g, Parks and Vu, 1994; Carpenter et al., 2004; Carlsson et al.,
2015).14
Next, we estimate equations (2) and (3) to examine the relationship between contribution to
14We also do not find any significant differences in behavior in the amounts and share contributed in
the public goods game between the Red River and Mekong River Delta regions (p − value = 0.64 and
p− value = 0.38 respectively).
14
the public good and inequality in a regression framework. In Table 3, the outcome variable
is the amount contributed while in Table 4, we study the share of one’s endowment allocated
to the public good. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that subjects in unequal groups contribute
significantly less (by approximately VND 4,200) than those in equal groups, similar to the
difference observed in Table 2. On the other hand, while the share contributed in unequal
groups is smaller, the difference is not statistically significant (column 1 of Table 4). We then
further disaggregate the subjects in the unequal endowment group into low (VND 30,000)
and high (VND 90,000) with the equal group (VND 60,000) being the omitted category.
Table 3, column 3 shows that those with low endowments contribute a significantly smaller
absolute amount than those in equal groups, while those with higher endowments contribute
a significantly larger amount.
However, when considering the share allocated in Table 4, we find the opposite such that
low endowment subjects contribute a larger share than those in equal groups while high
endowment subjects contribute a smaller share. Further, the share contributed by high
endowment subjects is also significantly smaller than that contributed by low endowment
subjects. Finally, consistent with the effect of inequality in column 1, the joint effect of low
and high endowment is not significantly different from zero (p− value = 0.28).
We find that the results are robust to the addition of control variables (columns 2 and 4
of Tables 3 and 4). Among the controls we observe a significant positive effect of age on
cooperation. This could either be a life cycle effect such that people become more cooperative
as they grow older, or a cohort effect implying that collective action might be weakening
over time in rural Vietnam. These results in Table 4 are robust to using Tobit regressions
(Table A4 in the online Appendix) as well as to including controls for incentivized trust (i.e.,
share sent by sender in the trust game) and non-incentivized willingness to take risk (Table
A5 in the online Appendix).
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Next we examine how exposure to corruption affects the relationship between inequality and
cooperation, as measured by share contributed, within the same commune.15 We examine
this effect in a regression framework where we interact the corruption binary variable with
inequality and with low and high endowment respectively. As corruption is measured at the
commune level, its level effect is absorbed by the commune fixed effects. Our coefficients
of interest are on the interaction terms defined above and in equation (4). Columns 1
and 2 in Table 5 show that unequal groups contribute significantly smaller shares to public
goods in more corrupt communes. Further, in columns 3 and 4, it is evident that both
high and low endowment subjects contribute significantly smaller shares in communes with
high corruption. While contributions fall in high corruption communes, we find that the
low endowment subjects continue to contribute significantly higher shares compared to high
endowment subjects. Together, these indicate that corruption exacerbates the effect of
inequality on cooperation, and this finding supports our second hypothesis.
We also examine the robustness of our results to different ways of measuring commune-
level corruption. The first is a continuous commune-level index, based on the average of
individual responses, that lies between 0 and 6. The second is where the sample is restricted
to communes where the corruption index is either high or low to account for the fact that
communes close to the median may be quite similar in terms of corruption. We construct a
high corruption dummy variable that takes value 1 if the corruption index is above the 70th
percentile and 0 if the corruption index is below the 30th percentile. The third corruption
measure is based on forming the high corruption dummy variable by excluding the first
statement in the corruption inventory. As it may be the case that the first statement captures
beliefs more than experiences, we check the robustness of our results by excluding it from
our construction of the corruption indicator. Results available in Tables A7, A8 and A9
15The results for the effects of corruption on the relationship between inequality and amount contributed
are similar and are presented in Table A6 in the online Appendix.
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respectively show that our main results in Table 5 are robust to these changes.
4.2 The role of beliefs
In this section, we start out by showing, in accordance with the literature on conditional
cooperation (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Gächter and
Renner, 2018; Thöni et al., 2012), that in our sample, subjects base their own contribution
decisions on how much they believe others contribute to the public good. More importantly,
we examine the effect of inequality on beliefs, and whether these beliefs are even more
pessimistic in the presence of corruption.
Figure 4 shows that one’s belief about average shares contributed by one’s group members
is positively correlated with one’s own contribution. This relationship between one’s con-
tribution and beliefs regarding contributions by others in the group is explored formally
in Table 6. After controlling for individual characteristics and commune fixed effects, we
find that the correlation is less than 1, implying that while people reciprocate changes in
others’ contributions they do so less than proportionally. In both the pooled sample and
when limiting the sample to the equal endowment groups, we find that there is a positive
and significant correlation between average beliefs and own contributions (columns 1 and 2).
However, within the unequal groups in column 3, we find that beliefs about contributions
of high endowment subjects are significantly more important than those of low endowment
subjects in determining one’s contribution to the public good (p − value = 0.09). Fur-
ther, when analyzing this relationship based on individuals’ own endowment, we find that
for high endowment subjects, their own contribution behavior is dependent on their beliefs
about contributions of other similar high endowment members rather than on their beliefs of
low endowment group members (p− value ≤ 0.001). On the other hand, results in column 4
show that low endowment subjects’ contributions are conditioned similarly based on beliefs
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about other high and low endowment group members (p− value = 0.56).
Given that contributions are strongly conditional on beliefs about others’ contributions, is it
the case that inequality and corruption negatively affect beliefs, and thereby contributions?
Regression analyses presented in Table 7 show that inequality negatively affects beliefs re-
garding contributions by others in the group and that this effect is exacerbated in communes
with high corruption (column 1). In column 2, we find that low endowment subjects in
high corruption communes report significantly lower beliefs than low endowment subjects
in communes with low corruption. Overall, both low and high endowment subjects report
lower beliefs regarding the contributions of others, and those reductions are not significantly
different from each other (p− value = 0.67).
To summarize, we find evidence that beliefs play a role in explaining our results. We find that
subjects are conditional cooperators. Furthermore, we find that inequality worsens beliefs,
and corruption further intensifies this negative effect.
4.3 Corruption and generalized beliefs
Until now, we have argued that beliefs about others’ willingness to contribute are inferior
in the presence of inequality and high corruption, and that is an important mechanism
explaining our results on cooperation. In this section, we leverage other components of our
experiments and survey to underscore that corruption has indirect costs and is associated
with more adverse beliefs about the pro-sociality of one’s fellow citizens more generally. This
has also been documented in other works that examine the effect of corruption on measures
of trust (e.g., Banerjee, 2016).
In Table 8, we examine if commune-level corruption is correlated with behavior in other
experimental tasks in our study, namely: share sent by sender in the trust game (measure
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of trust, column 1) and average share returned by receiver in the trust game (measure of
trustworthiness, column 2). We also use as outcomes the responses to some non-incentivized
questions in the post-experiment questionnaire such as: ‘generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’
(column 3), ‘would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or are they
mostly just looking out for themselves?’ (column 4) and ‘do you think most people would
try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?’ (column
5). As controls, we include individual characteristics and commune observables (instead of
commune fixed effects) to allow for inclusion of the commune-level corruption variable. The
commune characteristics we include are population size, share of poor households, share of
ethnic majority (Kinh) households, distance to main road, distance to district centre, and
whether the commune is located in Red River Delta.
Our results in Table 8 show that subjects are less trustworthy in communes characterized
by higher corruption (column 2). The non-incentivized measure of generalized trust which
has been shown to measure stable expectations about others’ trustworthiness in developing
country contexts (Banerjee, 2018) is also significantly lower in more corrupt communes (col-
umn 3). Similarly, corruption is negatively associated with beliefs that others are helpful
(column 4). Subjects send slightly higher shares in the trust game and are less likely to
believe that people are fair in areas with higher corruption but these results are not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels (columns 1 and 5). Overall, this set of results appears
to support the hypothesis that exposure to corruption adversely affects behavior and beliefs
about others’ pro-sociality.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
We conducted a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 partici-
pants across 56 communes in rural Vietnam to examine the effects of inequality on cooper-
ation, and whether this relationship is affected by institutional quality as proxied by levels
of prevailing local corruption. We induce inequality by experimentally varying the distri-
bution of initial endowments. We find that aggregate contributions to the public good are
significantly lower in unequal groups. However, in terms of share contributed, we do not find
any differences between equal and unequal groups. Within unequal groups, low endowment
individuals contribute a higher share to the public good than high endowment individu-
als. Further, both low and high endowment types contribute smaller shares in communes
characterized by higher corruption levels. In line with previous studies, we find evidence
supporting conditional cooperation such that individuals’ own contributions are positively
and significantly correlated with their beliefs about others’ average contributions. In areas
with high corruption, both high and low endowment individuals believe others contribute
smaller shares. We believe this is an important mechanism that explains why corruption ex-
acerbates the effects of inequality on cooperation. Our findings imply that rising inequality
potentially harms collective action in rural areas of developing countries, and that this effect
is intensified by poor governance. This bolsters the case for policies that keep inequality in
check and strengthen institutions. Strengthening the accountability of local governments,
for example through competitive elections or transparency initiatives, may be an example of
a measure, which contributes to both of these agendas.
Ostrom (1990) and a number of other scholars have argued that government intervention is
often not the optimal solution to local-level collective action problems, and that communities
have significant capacity to solve such problems on their own. However, the result that
poor individuals contribute a larger share of their endowment to public goods production
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than rich individuals is now emerging as a stylized fact (e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006;
Hargreaves-Heap et al., 2006). This has important implications for the distributional impacts
of projects based on voluntary contributions. If we imagine, hypothetically, that public goods
production in our experiment had been financed by a compulsory, proportional wealth tax
equal to the average share contributed in the experiment, then ex-post inequality would have
been lower than what we observe in our data. Proportionality is arguably the most common
principle in taxation (for income taxes, wealth taxes or value added tax), whereas this does
not appear to be the case for voluntary contributions to joint projects. Hence, tax-based
systems may be more egalitarian than systems based on voluntary commitment. In some
respects then, government intervention may be superior to community-based solutions.
On the other hand, our results also show that the voluntary contribution mechanism works
least well in environments of high corruption. These are also the environments where tax-
based systems tend to perform poorly. In this regard, our results support the conclusion
that strengthening of local institutions is an essential prerequisite both for facilitating public
goods production and for reducing inequality.
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Almås, I., Cappelen, A.W., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2010). Fairness and the
development of inequality acceptance. Science, 328(5982), 1176-1178.
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Figure 1: Map of study provinces
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Figure 2: Aggregate contributions to public good
Source: Authors’ illustration based on experimental data.
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Figure 3: Public good contributions and endowment heterogeneity
Source: Authors’ illustration based on experimental data.
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Figure 4: Contributions and beliefs
Source: Authors’ illustration based on experimental data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Full sample Equal Endowments Unequal Endowments Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.02
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 38.76 39.13 38.39 -0.74
(10.58) (10.57) (10.58)
High school education 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Married 0.81 0.83 0.79 -0.04∗
(0.39) (0.38) (0.41)
Kinh 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.01
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25)
Assets 9.04 9.11 8.97 -0.14
(2.59) (2.59) (2.58)
Poor household 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
F-test joint significance 0.93
F-test p-value 0.48
Number of sessions 112 56 56
Observations 1344 672 672 1344
Notes: The table shows the balance in the key characteristics of participants in the experimental session. Poor
household is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by the government. Differ-
ences in column 4 are tested using two-sided proportions test (for dichotomous variables only) or t-test (all other
variables). * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 2: Differences in public good contributions
Full sample Equal Endowments Unequal Endowments Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount contributed to PG (’000 VND) 31.19 33.28 29.09 -4.20∗∗∗
(19.27) (18.14) (20.13)
Share contributed to PG 0.55 0.55 0.54 -0.02
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28)
Free rider 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
Full contributor 0.20 0.21 0.19 -0.02
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40)
Observations 1344 672 672 1344
Notes: Differences in column 4 are tested using two-sided proportions test (for dichotomous variables only) or t-test (all other vari-
ables). * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Amount contributed to public good
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment -4.196∗∗∗ -3.937∗∗∗
(0.886) (0.886)
Low endowment -13.850∗∗∗ -13.559∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.882)














Poor household 1.540 0.859
(2.115) (2.095)
Constant 21.890∗∗∗ 22.383∗∗∗ 21.890∗∗∗ 21.825∗∗∗
(4.116) (4.033) (4.117) (3.687)
Wald test p-value:
β(Low) = β(High) 0.00 0.00
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.067 0.084 0.19 0.21
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Share contributed to public good
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment -0.016 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014)
Low endowment 0.093∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)














Poor household -0.002 0.006
(0.035) (0.033)
Constant 0.361∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.060)
Wald test p-value:
β(Low) = β(High) 0.00 0.00
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.068 0.085 0.14 0.15
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parenthe-
ses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
36
Table 5: Share contributed and corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment 0.035∗ 0.038∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Unequal*High Corruption -0.102∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028)
Low endowment 0.134∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021)
High endowment -0.063∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
Low Endw*High Corruption -0.082∗∗ -0.082∗∗
(0.034) (0.033)
High Endw*High Corruption -0.122∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034)
Constant 0.668∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.103) (0.023) (0.102)
Wald test p-value:
β(Low) + β(Low ∗HighCorr) = β(High) + β(High ∗HighCorr) 0.00 0.00
Controls No Yes No Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.075 0.092 0.14 0.16
Notes: Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard
errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Share contributed and beliefs
Full sample Equal Unequal Unequal
Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beliefs: av. share contributed 0.592∗∗∗
(0.039)
Beliefs: share contributed 0.590∗∗∗
(0.058)
Beliefs: share contributed by Low 0.217∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.061
(0.074) (0.083) (0.082)
Beliefs: share contributed by High 0.413∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.075) (0.084)
Constant 0.139∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.187∗ -0.014
(0.057) (0.103) (0.071) (0.107) (0.132)
Wald test p-value:
β(BeliefLow) = β(BeliefHigh) 0.097 0.559 0.001
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1343 672 671 335 336
R-squared 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.42 0.39
Notes: Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household
poverty status. Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Beliefs, inequality and corruption










Low Endw*High Corruption -0.067∗∗
(0.027)





β(Low) + β(Low ∗HighCorr) = β(High) + β(High ∗HighCorr) 0.67
Controls Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes
N 1343 1343
R-squared 0.12 0.12
Notes: Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty sta-
tus. Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at
5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Corruption and generalized beliefs










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High corruption 0.032 -0.065∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.190
(0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) (0.128)
Female -0.008 -0.034∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.280∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023) (0.129)
Age 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
High school education 0.016 0.018 -0.018 -0.042 -0.201
(0.020) (0.015) (0.028) (0.029) (0.127)
Married 0.040∗ -0.005 -0.009 0.103∗∗ 0.104
(0.021) (0.017) (0.036) (0.045) (0.173)
Kinh 0.011 0.044 -0.063 -0.021 -0.258
(0.046) (0.027) (0.069) (0.063) (0.263)
Assets 0.001 0.005 -0.005 -0.013∗∗ -0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.032)
Poor household -0.053∗ -0.030 -0.004 -0.008 -0.151
(0.032) (0.027) (0.047) (0.048) (0.254)
Red River Delta -0.014 0.026 0.087∗∗ -0.035 0.371∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.021) (0.036) (0.039) (0.141)
Constant 0.543∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.184∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 5.454∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.061) (0.105) (0.107) (0.457)
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.63 0.57 0.49 0.70 6.77
N 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343
R-squared 0.023 0.056 0.083 0.087 0.070
Notes: Commune level controls include population, share of poor households, share of ethnic majority (Kinh) households, dis-
tance to main road, and distance to district centre. People are fair takes values from 1-10. Standard errors clustered at the session
level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Appendix A: Supplementary figures and tables
Figure A1: An experimental session
2
Table A1: Comparison of study sample with the VHLSS




High school education 0.54 0.27
Married 0.81 0.78
Kinh 0.93 0.95
Poor household 0.08 0.07
Observations 1344 6438
Notes: This table compares the sample characteristics
with those in the 2016 Vietnam Household and Living
Standards Survey (VHLSS 2016). The VHLSS 2016 fig-
ures are based on information collected from respondents
of rural communes in the same 22 provinces as the exper-
imental sample. The VHLSS did not collect information
on the same assets reported in Table 1. Poor household
is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being
classified as poor by the government.
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Table A2: Corruption statements
Statement Mean SD
(1) (2)
1 In my commune/ward, officials divert funds from the state
budget for their personal benefit.
0.16 0.37
2 People have to pay bribes in order to obtain a land title. 0.28 0.45
3 People like me have to bribe to receive medical treatment in
the district’s hospitals.
0.33 0.47
4 Parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to be
better attended at the primary school nearest to my house.
0.26 0.44
5 In my commune/ward, officials receive kickbacks in exchange
for approval of construction permits.
0.20 0.40
6 In order to get a job in the government, people have to pay a
bribe.
0.37 0.48
Notes: This table reports the share of participants who agree with the given statements in the
post-experiment survey.
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Table A3: Robustness check: determinants of corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment -0.045 -0.050
(0.059) (0.060)
Low endowment -0.065 -0.073
(0.089) (0.090)
High endowment -0.024 -0.028
(0.089) (0.092)
Constant 0.814∗∗∗ 2.447∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 2.446∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.411) (0.033) (0.410)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18
Notes: The outcome variable in all regressions is the individual level corrup-
tion index, which takes values from 0-6. Controls include age, gender, ed-
ucation, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty
status. Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in paren-
theses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A4: Share contributed to public good: Tobit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment -0.018 -0.013
(0.018) (0.018)
Low endowment 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)














Poor household -0.010 -0.002
(0.043) (0.041)
Constant 0.507∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.101) (0.033) (0.098)
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
Notes: The outcome variable is the share contributed in the public goods game.
Standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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β(Low) = β(High) 0.00
Controls Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes
N 1343 1343
R-squared 0.17 0.24
Notes: The outcome variable is the share contributed
in the public goods game. Controls include age, gender,
education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets,
and household poverty status. Trust is measured by
the proportion of endowment sent by the sender in the
investment game. Willingness to take risk takes values
from 1-10. Standard errors clustered at the session level
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** sig-
nificant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Low Endw*High Corruption -4.777∗∗∗
(1.703)





β(Low) + β(Low ∗HighCorr) = β(High) + β(High ∗HighCorr) 0.00
Controls Yes Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes
N 1343 1343
R-squared 0.091 0.22
Notes: The outcome variable is the amount contributed in the public goods game. Controls include age,
gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard er-
rors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,***
significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Share contributed to public good: Using continuous corruption measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment 0.090∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033)
Unequal*Corruption Index -0.066∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)
Low endowment 0.189∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
High endowment -0.009 -0.015
(0.039) (0.041)
Low endw*Corruption Index -0.060∗∗ -0.057∗∗
(0.024) (0.024)
High endw*Corruption Index -0.072∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.535∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.081) (0.041) (0.079)
Wald test p-value:
β(Low) + β(Low ∗HighCorr) = β(High) + β(High ∗HighCorr) 0.00 0.00
Controls No Yes No Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.074 0.091 0.14 0.16
Notes: The outcome variable is the share contributed in the public goods game. Controls include age, gender, education, ethnic-
ity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. The Corruption Index takes values from 0-6. Standard errors
clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A8: Share contributed to public good: dropping 30th − 70th percentile of corruption
index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment 0.043∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.022) (0.021)
Unequal*High corruption -0.136∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Low endowment 0.142∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)
High endowment -0.055∗ -0.055∗
(0.029) (0.029)
Low endw*High corruption -0.128∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043)
High endw*High corruption -0.145∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042)
Constant 0.532∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.056)
Wald test p-value:
β(Low) + β(Low ∗HighCorr) = β(High) + β(High ∗HighCorr) 0.00 0.00
Controls No Yes No Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 816 816 816 816
R-squared 0.079 0.10 0.14 0.16
Notes: The outcome variable is the share contributed in the public goods game. The sample is restricted to communes where the
corruption index is either below the 30th percentile or above the 70th percentile. High corruption is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if the corruption index is above the 70th percentile, and 0 if corruption index is below 30th percetile. Controls include age,
gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard errors clustered at the session
level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A9: Share contributed to public good: using 5 corruption statements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal endowment 0.038∗ 0.040∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Unequal*High Corruption -0.107∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Low endowment 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
High endowment -0.059∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
Low Endw*High Corruption -0.083∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.034) (0.033)
High Endw*High Corruption -0.131∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Constant 0.539∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.103) (0.058) (0.102)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Commune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1344 1343 1344 1343
R-squared 0.076 0.093 0.15 0.16
Notes: The outcome variable is the share contributed in the public goods game. High
Corruption dummy variable is formed by excluding the first statement in the corruption
inventory (see Table A2 for the list of statements). Controls include age, gender, educa-
tion, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard
errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,**
significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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